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HABEAS CORPUS: ITS HISTORY 
AND ITS FUTURE 
Charles Alan Wright* 
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS. By William F. 
Duker. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1980. Pp. 349. $29.95. 
Habeas corpus is in disarray. To many the "Great Writ," as it has been 
called by justices from John Marshall1 to Sandra Day O'Connor,2 has lost 
its halo.3 There is _uncertainty about what the function of habeas corpus 
ought to be, the Supreme Court vacillates between contracting and ex-
panding the substantive grounds on which the writ will lie, while at the 
same time the procedural rules for seeking the writ are consistently being 
made more difficult to satisfy. As I have written elsewhere: 
The most controversial and friction-producing issue in the relation be-
tween the federal courts and the states is federal habeas corpus for state 
prisoners. Commentators are critical of its present scope, federal judges 
are unhappy at the burden of thousands of mostly frivolous petitions, state 
courts resent having their decisions reexamined by a single federal district 
judge, and the Supreme Court in recent terms has shown a strong inclina-
tion to limit its availability. Meanwhile, prisoners thrive on it as a form of 
occupational therapy and for a few it serves as a means of redressing con-
stitutional violations.4 
At such a troubled time, the appearance of what is said to be the first 
book published on the history of habeas corpus (p. 7) seemed a welcome 
event. Perhaps a fuller understanding of what has occurred in the past 
would give valuable insight into what the writ ought to be in the future. 
That hope was not fulfilled. Indeed Mr. Duker virtually says that it is a 
hope that cannot be fulfilled. He is critical of those who "have viewed his-
tory as an event rather than as a process and therefore have failed to take 
note of the most striking characteristic of the writ of habeas corpus: like 
liberty itself, the writ is the product of continuous creation" (p. 7). To him 
"[h]istory is studied to give perspective not legitimacy" (p. 267). 
The first three chapters, tracing the history of the writ from its English 
origins down to the Civil War, are fascinating reading for those who have 
* William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, The University of Texas Law 
School. A.B. 1947, Wesleyan University; LL.B. 1949, Yale University. - Ed. 
l. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807). 
2. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 15S8 (1982). 
3. "There has been a halo about the 'Great Writ' that no one would wish to dim. Yet one 
must wonder whether the stretching of its use far beyond any justifiable purpose will not in the 
end weaken rather than strengthen the writ's vitality." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 275 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). 
4. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURIS· 
DICTION S58 (1978) (footnote 01nitted) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER'& COOPER]. 
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not already learned much of this from articles in legal periodicals. The 
final three chapters, which in substance carry the story from the Act of Feb-
ruary 5, 1867,5 down through the most recent decisions at the time the book 
was written, are considerably less satisfying. Unfortunately it is the 1867 
statute, giving the federal courts power to grant the writ "in all cases where 
any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the consti-
tution, or of any treaty or law of the United States"6 that made federal 
habeas corpus available to state prisoners. This is the aspect of habeas 
corpus that is at the heart of the present controversy and uncertainty. 
We think of habeas corpus as an important safeguard of liberty. To 
Chief Justice Chase it was "the best and only sufficient defence of personal 
freedom."7 To Chief Justice Warren it was "both the symbol and guardian 
of individual liberty."8 That is certainly not how it began. In a well-known 
article at the beginning of this century, Professor Jenks announced a "most 
embarrassing discovery, ... [T]he writ Habeas Corpus was originally in-
tended not to get people out of prison, but to put them in it ."9 In common 
with other more recent historians, Mr. Duker argues convincingly that Pro-
fessor Jenks confused habeas corpus with capias, and that while the two 
shared a certain resemblance and at certain periods interacted, they were 
distinct forms of process. Unlike capias, seizure pursuant to a writ of 
habeas corpus was not an arrest in a technical sense (pp. 19-23). 
The excellent chapter on the English origins, however, which had earlier 
appeared in a law review, 10 shows that habeas corpus was a prerogative 
writ to compel the appearance of persons. The Normans used it to central-
ize the judicial system by bringing disputes away from the local and ma-
norial courts into the royal courts. From the fifteenth to the seventeenth 
centuries the common-law courts used habeas corpus in their battles over 
jurisdiction with the Court of Chancery, and, to a lesser extent, the Court of 
High Commission, the Court of Admiralty, and the Court of Requests. As 
England moved toward Civil War, Parliament attempted to use habeas 
corpus in its struggle for power against the King. 
This history is fascinating, but if I may borrow a sentence Judge 
Friendly wrote about another study of English legal history thought to have 
relevance to contemporary American problems, "[a]lthough this history is 
absorbing, I do not find it a vade mecum ."11 Mr. Duker says, for example, 
that "[t]he underlying reason for the rule that res judicata had no applica-
tion to habeas proceedings was that since no appeal against a refusal to 
issue the writ or to discharge the prisoner was available, it would have been 
intolerable for a person to have the legality of his custody determined con-
5. Ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (1867). 
6. Id. This is codified with only verbal changes in 28 U.S.C. § 224l(c)(3) (1976). 
1. Ex parle Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). 
8. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968). 
9. Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus, 18 L.Q. REv. 64, 65 (1902) (emphasis in 
original). 
10. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Peculiar Path lo Fame, 53 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 983 (1978). 
11. Friendly, The F{fih Amendment Tomollow: The Case far Constitutional Change, 37 U. 
CIN. L. REv. 671, 678 (1968). 
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elusively by the first judicial body to hear the matter" (pp. 5-6). The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the rule about res judicata derives from 
this fact at common law, but has thought that not a complete explanation. 
"[I]ts roots would seem to go deeper. Conventional notions of finality of 
litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of 
constitutional rights is alleged." 12 One need not necessarily agree that con-
ventional notions of res judicata should have "no place" in habeas corpus. 13 
Still, in light of the drastic change in the function and purpose of the writ, 
the fact that, unlike the situation in English common law, appeal is now 
ordinarily available from a refusal to issue the writ14 hardly seems decisive 
on what weight, if any, should be given to prior determinations. 
Mr. Duker continues by recounting the extension of habeas corpus to 
the British colonies in North America and the inclusion of the suspension 
clause in the Constitution.15 He concludes, as do many scholars, that the 
constitutional language was not intended to guarantee a federal writ of 
habeas corpus but only to limit the circumstances in which Congress could 
interfere with the issuance of state writs of habeas corpus. The argument is 
plausible, but this has not been the Supreme Court's understanding. Al-
though Chief Justice Marshall said that the power to award the writ by any 
of the courts of the United States must be given by written law, he consid-
ered that the Constitution imposed on Congress "the obligation of provid-
ing efficient means by which this great constitutional privilege should 
receive life and activity .... " 16 The argument is advanced today that the 
suspension clause does not require Congress to provide a federal remedy 
for collateral review of a conviction entered by a court of competent juris-
diction, but this is on the view that the Constitution protects only the scope 
of the writ as it was known at the time the Constitution was drafted, rather 
than on any theory that the Constitution is speaking only to habeas corpus 
from a state court and not to federal habeas corpus.17 
As a part of this argument against Marshall's reading of the Constitu-
tion as imposing an obligation on Congress, Mr. Duker points out that by 
the time the Constitutional Convention came to consider habeas corpus, it 
had already firmly fixed upon the idea that it was to be optional with Con-
gress whether to create any lower federal courts (p. 127). This demon-
strates, he says, "that the 'obligation theory' espoused by Marshall . . . is 
questionable, since Congress was without power to impose jurisdiction on 
the state courts" (p. 157 n.13). For that proposition he cites a gratuitous 
dictum from Justice Washington.18 It is true that through the first part of 
12. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). 
13. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Co/lateral A/lack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 142, 149-50 (1970). 
14. A certificate of probable cause is required. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1976). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2: "The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." 
16. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. See also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236, 238 (1963). 
11. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384-85 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bounds 
v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 835 (1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). 
18. "For I hold it to be perfectly clear, that Congress cannot confer jurisdiction upon any 
Courts, but such as exist under the constitution and laws of the United States, although the 
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the nineteenth century until the 1860s there were instances in which the 
Supreme Court "and state courts broadly questioned the power and duty of 
state courts to . . . enforce United States civil and penal statutes or the 
power of the Federal Government to require them to do so." 19 That ques-
tion has long since been resolved, and it is now clear, as history shows the 
Framers must have contemplated, that Congress has always had power to 
require state courts to entertain claims created by federal statute.20 
At several points in this portion of the book Mr. Duker takes issue with 
the quite different interpretation of the historical evidence in a well-known 
article by Francis Paschal, The Consitution and Habeas Corpus.21 Unfortu-
nately both in the text (p. 136) and at twelve places in the footnotes and 
Bibliography, Duker refers to "Pascal" and the title of the article is given as 
"Habeas Corpus and the Constitution." Ordinarily I would think it infra 
dig for a reviewer even to take note of insignificant errors of this kind, but 
in this instance I think it needs to be mentioned. Much of the historical 
material in the first half of this book is derived from original research by 
Mr. Duker into the primary materials, the ancient records themselves. I am 
not trained as a historian and am obliged to rely on secondary sources such 
as his book. But when I find that he consistently makes an obvious error in 
citing a modem, easily checked source, what confidence can I have that he 
has not made similar mistakes in reporting his :findings from the materials I 
cannot check?22 
In the final three chapters of the book Mr. Duker is, for the most part, 
writing about current events, not history. I agree with another reviewer 
who has observed that "[t]he treatment here is at times disappointing, at 
least to lawyers who demand the thorough research and analytical precision 
that the historian seeking overview tends to neglect."23 The literature 
abounds with articles that have analyzed these recent developments more 
thoroughly and more thoughtfully, nor is Mr. Duker's presentation 
strengthened by his partisanship for one particular point of view.24 
Whatever the historical origins of habeas corpus may have been, in the 
State Courts may exercise jurisdiction on cases authorized by the laws of the state, and not 
prohibited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal Courts." Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 1, 27-28 (1820). Justice Washington later notes that the members of the Court who 
agree with the result announced in his opinion "do not concur in all respects in the reasons 
which influence my opinion." 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 32. See also the discussion of the Houston 
case in Currie, 'I7ze Constitution in the Supreme Court: 'I7ze Powers of the Federal Courts, 1831-
1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 702-05 (1982). 
19. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947) (footnote omitted). 
20. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS§ 45 (4th ed. 1983). 
21. 1970 DUKE LJ. 605. 
22. There are other instances of obvious sloppiness in the book. Justice Black is quoted (p. 
7) as speaking of "the protection of the individual against erosion of their right. . . ." Of 
course he said "individuals." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 246 (1963). When Mr. 
Duker uses the famous quotation from Professor Jenks that I have quoted in the text accompa-
nying note 9 supra, he inserts an "of' in it that does not appear in the original (p. 13). 
23. Yackle, Book Review, 17 CRIM. L. BULL. 479, 487 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
24. A Canadian law professor, reviewing Mr. Duker's book for a British audience, says: 
"The author's uncritical enthusiasm for judicial activism and his almost mystical belief in the 
power of habeas corpus may seem odd to non-American readers." Sharpe, Book Review, PuB. 
L., Spring 1982, at 154, 156. 
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United States today the function of the writ is thought to be "the protection 
of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful re-
straints upon their liberty,"25 or, more guardedly, as "a bulwark against 
convictions that violate 'fundamental fairness.' "26 Yet it still retains some-
thing of its ancient character as a weapon for jurisdictional disputes be-
tween branches or levels of government. As the author aptly says: 
"Throughout this century in the United States, habeas corpus has been the 
medium of the dialogue of federalism between the federal and state courts" 
'(p. 156). The expansion of the writ in the 1950s and 1960s has strengthened 
the federal courts at the expense of their state counterparts and has been a 
means for imposing federal constitutional standards on state criminal 
proceedings. 
As noted at the outset of this review, these developments have stirred 
much controversy. There has been a countermovement, particularly since 
1976, but it is unclear how far it will go and there is no agreement on where 
it should go. On the one hand, for example, Judge Friendly's suggestion 
that for the most part convictions should be subject to collateral attack only 
when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable 
claim of innocence27 has found sympathetic listeners in high places.28 Yet 
in an important recent book, my colleague, Philip Bobbitt, has made quite a 
contrary suggestion. He thinks that the view that moral arguments should 
generally be excluded from the constitutional discourse 
justifies, for example, the phenomenon of federal habeas corpus, for which 
it is otherwise difficult to give good grounds. Habeas corpus severs the 
constitutional decision from the moral question of guilt or innocence, so 
that the former can be dispassionately weighed as one suspects it seldom 
can be in the context of a trial. At the same time federal habeas corpus 
gives the matter to a group of deciders whose customary business is, by 
comparison to state courts, largely amoral. It is the state courts that must 
confront questions of moral blame, broken promises, negligent or inten-
tional harm, marital collapse, and virtually all crime. The federal courts, 
on the other hand, except for their diversity jurisdiction, are largely given 
over to matters of government regulation, intergovernmental conflict, and 
national commerce. Federal habeas corpus enables the constitutional 
questions to be given the priority they can seldom achieve when held in the 
balance with a moral conviction widely enough shared to have found its 
way into a state's criminal code.29 
Professor Bobbitt's point is a thoughtful one, and merits careful 
consideration. 
The changes in habeas corpus in the past seven years have not all been 
in one direction. In terms of the substantive grounds for which the writ will 
lie, the best known case is Stone v. Powel!,30 holding that fourth amend-
25. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 243 (1963). 
26. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 
(1977)). 
27. Friendly, supra note 13, at 142. 
28. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 265-66 (Powell, J.,joined by Burger, C.J., 
and Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
29. P. BOBBIIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 140 (1982). 
30. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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ment claims may not be heard on habeas corpus if the state has provided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim. To Mr. Duker: "Stone 
v. Powell represented the triumph of those who had been working to block 
the expansion of federal habeas jurisdiction which the Warren Court had 
accelerated to insure the transmission of its concept of criminal justice to 
the state court" (p. 264). Yet it seemed when Stone came down that it was 
bottomed on dislike for the exclusionary rule, rather than of habeas corpus, 
and the Court has refused to extend the full and fair opportunity rule to 
other constitutional violations, explaining that in Stone it had "made it 
clear that it was confining its ruling to cases involving the judicially created 
exclusionary rule .... "31 The Court has also refused to make clear what it 
means by "full and fair opportunity" despite the varied views on this point 
in the circuits.32 
In Rose v. Mitchel/33 and Jackson v. Virginia 34 the Court has held that 
habeas corpus will lie in circumstances where previously it had not been 
thought to be available. The decision in Rose, that the writ will run if there 
is racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman even 
though there was no constitutional impropriety in the selection of the petit 
jury and guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial free 
from constitutional error, can be explained in terms of the abhorrence with 
which we view racial discrimination of any kind, and especially discrimina-
tion that infects the judicial system. The ruling in Jackson, however, that a 
prisoner is entitled to the federal writ if it is found that upon the evidence 
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, seems a triumph oflogic over practicality. The 
Jackson Court recognized that "most meritorious challenges to constitu-
tional sufficiency of the evidence undoubtedly will be recognized in the 
state courts . . . ."35 That is clearly true. But since this new ground is one 
that can plausibly be asserted by very many state prisoners and it is one that 
a federal court cannot ordinarily reject without first reading the entire rec-
ord of the state trial, the effect is to burden the courts without any signifi-
cant benefit to anyone. My purpose here, however, is not to argue the 
merits of these cases, but only to show that the Court has not moved 
monolithically in a single direction with regard to the substantive grounds 
for habeas in the recent cases. 
- On the procedural side, however, the recent decisions have all gone one 
way, and have created an increasingly difficult set of barriers that a state 
prisoner must overcome before a federal court will be allowed to decide 
whether his constitutional claim has any merit. The statute itself requires 
that the prisoner exhaust his state remedies before seeking habeas corpus.36 
The exhaustion requirement cannot be ignored no matter how clear the 
31. Rose v. Mitchell, 433 U.S. 545, 560 (1979). 
32. See Justice White's dissent from denial of certiorari in Shoemaker v. Riley, 103 S. Ct. 
266 (1982). 
33. 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
34. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
35. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. at 322. 
36. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(b), (c) (1976). See 17 WRIGHT, MlLLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at 
§4264. 
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violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights.37 Nor is the requirement 
satisfied unless the prisoner has fairly presented the same claim to the state 
court that he makes to the federal court.38 But it was only "the substance" 
of the claim that must first be presented to the state courts and it was not 
necessary that the prisoner have cited "book and verse on the federal con-
stitution."39 Today that rule is applied with great severity, and a petition 
must be dismissed if there is any significant difference between the phrasing 
of the claim in federal court and in state court, no matter how unlikely it 
may be that the state court would have reached another result if the claim 
to it had been in the words later used in federal court.40 
Most of the circuits had thought that if a prisoner presented a "mixed 
petition," in which state remedies had been exhausted on some claims but 
not on others, they could reach the merits of the exhausted claims while 
dismissing the unexhausted claims.41 That view has now been rejected. To-
tal exhaustion is required. The prisoner has the choice of postponing his 
attempt to get federal relief until he has gone back to state court and ex-
hausted the remaining claims or of resubmitting to the federal court a peti-
tion presenting only the exhausted claims.42 There are great hazards in the 
latter course for the prisoner, because four members of the Court have said 
that ifhe resubmits his exhausted claims and is unsuccessful, and thereafter 
he exhausts his state remedies on the other claims and presents them to the 
federal court in a later habeas corpus petition, he may have that later peti-
tion dismissed under Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b) on the ground that his fail-
ure to present the claims in his earlier petition was an abuse of the writ.43 
Even the prisoner who masters the intricacies of exhaustion is not out of 
the woods. If the prisoner has been successful when he presented his consti-
tutional contention to the state court, he will have been released, or retried, 
and has no need to resort to federal court. Applications for habeas corpus 
come, then, only where the state court has rejected the constitutional con-
tention or for some reason or another has failed to pass on it. 
If the state court has rejected the constitutional contention, its findings 
of fact are presumed to be correct, and the prisoner has the burden of estab-
lishing by clear and convincing evidence that the determination is errone-
ous, unless one of eight circumstances specified by statute exist.44 In a case 
that has twice gone back and forth between the Ninth Circuit and the 
Supreme Court, new teeth have been put in that statute. It has been held 
37. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. I (1981). 
38. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971). 
39. 404 U.S. at 278 (quoting Daugherty v. Gladden, 257 F.2d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 1958)), 
40. Anderson v. Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276 (1982). 
41. 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at 640-43. 
42. Rose v. Lundy, 102 S. Ct. 1198 (1982). See also Bergman v. Burton, 102 S. Ct. 2026 
(1982). 
43. Rose v. Lundy, 102 s. Ct. at 1204-05. See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 
4, at §4267. 
44. 28 u.s.c. § 2254(d) (1976). See 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 4, at 
§ 4265. 
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applicable even to findings by a state appellate court45 and while it remains 
the rule that the statute does not apply to a state court determination of a 
mixed question of law and fact, the Court has taken a strict view on 
whether the federal court was disagreeing with the state court on the ulti-
mate mixed question, to which the statute does not apply, or to the ques-
tions of fact that underlie that ultimate question, where the statute is 
applicable.46 . 
If the state court has not decided the federal claim, it will be because the 
prisoner has not asserted it properly in state court or because there is some 
adequate state ground that supports the conviction. This is the "abortive 
state proceeding" about which the permissive view taken in Fay v. Noia41 
has been virtually supplanted by the holding in Wainwright v. Sykes48 that 
federal relief can be had only if there is a showing of "cause" for the pris-
oner's failure to raise the issue properly at his trial and also a showing of 
actual prejudice. Although Wainwright did not define what was meant by 
"cause" and "prejudice," more recent cases have given meanings to those 
terms, and the meanings are not comforting to prisoners. The futility of 
presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause for 
a failure to object at trial, nor is it sufficient cause that defendant's lawyer 
was unaware of the basis for an objection if other defense lawyers have 
perceived and litigated the claim.49 A claim of prejudice must be evaluated 
in the total context of the events at trial and a defendant must show "not 
merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that 
they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire 
trial with error of constitutional dimensions."50 
Much can be said for each of these decisions, viewed individually. 
Taken as a group they seem questionable. Most habeas corpus petitions are 
filed by untutored laymen, not versed in the niceties of these elaborate pro-
cedural doctrines. Years ago Justice Rutledge described the Illinois system 
of post-conviction remedies as a "procedural labyrinth . . . made up en-
tirely of blind alleys."51 For many state prisoners federal habeas corpus 
will now seem to merit a similar description. It is not obvious that it is a 
wise use of precious federal judicial time, or a service to the states and the 
notion of federalism, to have many or most habeas corpus petitions dis-
posed of on procedural grounds. If the federal courts are free to reach the 
merits, they will find in the overwhelming bulk of the cases that the petition 
should be denied because the state courts have faithfully applied the com-
mands of the Federal Constitution. A rebuff to the prisoner on procedural 
grounds leaves a cloud, however frivolous, over the state conviction and is 
45. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981), on remand, 649 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1981), vacated 
and remanded per curiam, 102 S. Ct. 1303 (1982). 
46. Sumner v. Mata, 102 S. Ct. 1303 (1982), vacating and remanding per curiam 649 F.2d 
713 (9th Cir. 1981). The statute was also given a strict construction in Marshall v. Lonberger, 
51 U.S.L.W. 4113 (1983). 
47. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
48. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
49. Engle v. Isaac, 102 S. Ct. 1558 (1982). 
50. United States v. Frady, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1596 (1982) (emphasis in original). 
51. Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 567 (1947) (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
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simply an invitation to the prisoner to try and try again in the hope that 
sometime, somehow, he can push the right combination of buttons and ob-
tain a decision on the merits. 
In my view the proper resolution of the continuing controversy about 
habeas corpus will come only when there is substantial consensus on what 
its proper function is in a federal system in the late twentieth century. What 
happened when the Normans conquered England, though very interesting 
in its own right, does not seem to be of much help in achieving that consen-
sus. If there can be substantial agreement on the function of the writ, the 
substantive grounds on which it is to be available should fall readily in 
place. Finally a set of procedural rules are needed that will be clear, that 
will be understandable to prisoners, and that will give a fair opportunity to 
resolve constitutional contentions on their merits. 
Such a solution is far more likely to be achieved by legislation than it is 
by episodic decisionmaking. The Department of Justice and the Senate 
have been working in this direction.52 There is so much emotion about 
habeas corpus that the legislative proposals now pending are certain to 
arouse vigorous opposition from those who tend to rhapsodize about the 
Great Writ and to lament any attempt to confine it in any way. My hope is 
not that the present proposals will be adopted intact, but that they will stim-
ulate a dialogue in which open-minded and responsible people will be able 
to agree on what habeas corpus should be in the future. Mr. Duker's his-
tory has shown that the single most striking fact about habeas corpus over 
the years has been its ability to change. Presumably it retains that ability, 
and must do so if it is to meet the needs of today and tomorrow. 
52. S. 2838, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). See 128 CONG. REC. S11851-59 (daily ed. Sept. 
21, 1982). 
